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Intermediaries often arise in order to facilitate trade in markets characterized by asym-
metric information. In this paper we study the intermediary role of tour operators in the
market for package tourism. Policymakers have tried to address information asymmetries in
this market by providing hotel ratings. We show that those ratings are not accurate indi-
cators of quality and that tour operators play a vital role by pooling together information
about di®erent holiday destinations and providing their own ratings of accommodations.
We also ¯nd that signi¯cant price variation exists across countries, and that some countries
systematically under- or over-rate their hotels.
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Imperfect information is an important feature of many markets. One of its simplest and com-
monest forms is the asymmetric information case where the seller of an object knows its true
value while potential buyers do not. Akerlof (1970) pointed out how this informational asym-
metry can hinder the proper functioning of markets and lead to suboptimal levels of exchange.
In extreme cases, the buyer's inability to assess quality can kill markets for high quality goods.
This gloomy prediction is often circumvented in practice with various mechanisms such as the
provision of warranties and the building of reputations. In some markets, information asymme-
tries give rise to a new class of agents whose purpose is to ascertain the quality of an object and
make that information available to potential buyers. By providing that service the intermediary,
or middleman, mitigates the information problem and facilitates trade. Buyers and sellers can
both bene¯t from the presence of an intermediary and they are willing to pay for his services.
Thus the intermediary has an incentive to invest resources in acquiring the skills that enable him
to assess quality. Well-known intermediaries include ¯rms like Moody's and Standard & Poor's,
whose rating services play a crucial role in the proper functioning of ¯nancial markets. Other
agencies rate consumer products or services: Consumer Reports evaluates consumer products,
while the American Automobile Association rates hotels. Governments often take on the role of
the rater; for example, they provide health certi¯cation for restaurants and quality ratings for
hotels.
In all of the examples above the intermediary is a third party who facilitates a transaction
but is not directly involved in it. This is not always the case. In some markets, information
providers are also traders. Retailers are an obvious example. Consider a retailer who sells several
brands of consumer electronics. When a consumer walks into the store, the retailer provides
information about each of the products. In addition to technical features and speci¯cations,
the retailer may also relay to the prospective buyer the experience of other customers who have
previously purchased the product. The rise of the internet has formalized this process by allowing
consumers to rate products they have bought or merchants they have transacted with. Internet
1retailers such as amazon.com, auction sites like eBay.com and opinion sites like epinions.com
are excellent sources of information about products and merchants. In addition to the provision
of information, retailers may engage in other practices such as bundling together the products
of di®erent manufacturers or promoting some products more than others. Typically, however,
they will stop short of explicitly rating the products themselves.
In this paper we study a market where intermediaries play the multiple roles of bundlers,
traders and quality certi¯ers. The tourism industry is characterized by a large degree of asym-
metric information. Prospective tourists typically need to transact with agents such as hotels
and car rental agencies who are located in faraway destinations, often in foreign countries.
The quality of the accommodation and the surrounding locality is di±cult to ascertain without
¯rst-hand experience. In choosing a destination the tourist needs to search for information on
numerous available options, a process that can be costly and time-consuming. He also needs
to arrange transportation to his desired destination on his preferred dates; this is not always
easy to do. Tour operators step in and perform four vital intermediary functions. First, they
collect objective information about alternative destinations and present it in brochures suitable
for comparison shopping. Second, they provide subjective ratings of the di®erent destinations
based on both customer feedback and their own assessment of the facility. Third, they minimize
transaction costs by selling bundles of transportation, accommodation and other services. And
fourth, they exploit scale economies by pooling together tourists headed to the same destination.
We are interested in evaluating the intermediary role of tour operators in the international
travel industry. For our analysis we use data on the prices and characteristics of holiday packages
from the United Kingdom to various Mediterranean holiday destinations. Importantly, the data
include two quality ratings for each hotel. One is the \o±cial" rating given by the hotel's national
rating agency. Many governments { particularly of countries that try to promote tourism { have
entered the business of rating hotels in an e®ort to address the information problem faced by
prospective tourists. A second rating is provided by tour operators themselves. Although the two
ratings coincide in most cases, there is a substantial number of exceptions where tour operators
give either higher or lower ratings than the national agency.
2The fact that tour operators feel the need to intervene in the market by providing their own
ratings could be interpreted as an indication that government-provided ratings do not accurately
convey quality and fail to adequately address the information problem. Tour operators are in a
better position to provide accurate quality ratings for at least two reasons. First, each national
rating agency sets its own standards, so national ratings are not comparable across countries.
Second, national ratings are typically based on objective criteria that are easily veri¯able. Unlike
tour operator ratings, they rarely incorporate additional information such as consumer feedback.
Our data show that operator ratings are indeed less country-dependent than nationally provided
ratings. They do, therefore, go at least some way towards resolving the information asymmetry.
We also show that operator ratings are much more tightly correlated with prices, and are thus
likely to be better indicators of quality than national ratings.
Our second objective is to explore cross-country di®erences in price and quality. We ¯nd
that systematic price di®erences exist across the nine Mediterranean destinations covered in
our dataset. This prompts us to ask whether cross-country quality di®erences are just random
outcomes or the result of conscious national policies. We observe that some countries have higher
standards than others in assigning hotels to categories. We conjecture that this may indicate
that some countries use the hotel rating system as a means of manipulating hotel quality and
thus the quality of their national tourist product. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of
our ¯ndings and in particular whether further government intervention is warranted to improve
information availability to potential tourists.
2 Related literature
A substantial theoretical literature has analyzed the performance of markets when information
is incomplete. We focus on the asymmetric information case where consumers cannot precisely
assess a product's quality before purchasing it. A series of papers starting with Klein and Le²er
(1981) explores ways in which such market environments can sustain equilibria with a positive
price-quality relationship, signifying that price serves as a (correct) signal of quality. The main
3idea behind these papers is that an equilibrium with both high and low quality producers can
only be sustained if high-quality producers can set prices above competitive levels and earn
a positive stream of pro¯ts. Otherwise, they will be tempted to cut quality (and thus cost)
and increase short-run pro¯ts as unsuspecting consumers will purchase the damaged good at
the premium price. The mechanism that delivers this equilibrium varies from paper to paper.
In Klein and Le²er (1981) ¯rms add credibility to their quality promises by making sunk
investments in nonsalvageable capital (such as advertising). In Shapiro (1983) ¯rms build a
reputation by selling high-quality products at the low-quality price upon entering the market,
while in Allen (1984) consumers can infer product quality from the ¯rm's choice of price and
quantity.
A di®erent strand of the literature has explored the conditions under which intermediaries
(middlemen) emerge. In one set of papers (Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987, Fingleton 1997)
intermediaries facilitate exchange by speeding up the time-consuming matching process between
buyers and sellers. A second set of papers examines the scope for intermediation in markets
where product quality is unobserved. In Biglaiser (1993) and Biglaiser and Friedman (1994),
middlemen arise for two reasons. First, they buy more goods than an ordinary buyer and thus
have a greater incentive to invest in skills that enable them to detect the true quality of a
good. Second, because they are in the market for a long time they may place a higher value on
maintaining a reputation and thus be more likely to report the true quality of a good.
Marvel and McCa®erty (1984) argue that retailers implicitly act as quality certi¯ers by
stocking goods of a certain minimum quality; they use this insight as an explanation for resale
price maintenance. Chu and Chu (1994) build on that argument to show how manufacturers
of high quality products can signal their quality by distributing through reputable retailers. In
recent work in the speci¯c context of the hotel industry, Calveras and Vera-Hern¶ andez (2002)
show that tour operators may help raise the quality of hotels in a region by requesting quality
upgrades and internalizing quality externalities.
Much research e®ort has been devoted to the empirical assessment of the value of information.
In a recent example, Jin and Leslie (2003) study the impact of government provided information
4in the case of restaurant hygiene report cards. The ¯nd that the report card system has led
to an improvement in quality. Jin and Kato (2002) study the online market for baseball cards.
Sellers can either send their card to professionals to have it graded or they can make their own
(unveri¯able before purchase) claim about the card's quality. Both graded and ungraded cards
are traded on the market. The authors make two interesting observations. First, many high
quality cards are sold without being graded even though graded cards are sold at a premium that
is much greater than the cost of having a card graded. Second, a surprisingly large number of low-
quality ungraded cards are sold at premium prices, apparently because buyers take the seller's
quality claim as accurate. This example is a good illustration of the extent of the information
problem in many markets and the important role of intermediary rating services. Finally, we
note the existence of a large literature in ¯nance which tries to evaluate the information content
of bond ratings.1
3 The UK market for package holidays
Millions of North Americans and northern Europeans °ock to southern beach resorts every
summer. Geography dictates that Americans congregate in the Caribbean while Europeans
prefer the Mediterranean. The typical tourist is interested in a comfortable hotel, a sandy
beach, lots of sunshine, and plentiful food and drink. Package holidays that include all of the
above are designed with this tourist in mind. Tour operators provide centralized information
about holiday packages in the di®erent destinations. This information has traditionally been
distributed in glossy printed brochures, while recently it is becoming increasingly available on the
internet. It includes the details of the package (length of stay, services included, price, etc); hotel
characteristics (quality rating, amenities such as swimming pools, restaurants, athletic facilities,
cultural activities); and characteristics of the locality (distance to beach, distance to a town,
etc.). The large number of available destinations and easy access to centralized information give
the consumer a wide range of choices.
1For a recent example see Kliger and Sarig (2000).
5The UK holiday industry goes back many decades and is well-developed. A long history
of consolidation has left the industry with four major players: Thomson Holidays (part of The
World of TUI group), Thomas Cook, MyTravel Group (formerly Airtours) and First Choice.
In 1996 they held about 56% of the market, while the remainder was split among hundreds of
small tour operators, none of which had more than 2% of the market.2 The four major operators
are vertically integrated both upstream into air transportation (charter airline operation) and
downstream into retail distribution (ownership of travel agencies). The trend towards vertical
integration, which was completed in the 1990s, prompted an extensive investigation by the UK
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) regarding possible anti-competitive e®ects. The
investigation concluded that the anti-competitive impact of vertical integration was slight.
In 1999 Airtours and First Choice announced their intention to merge. The merger, which
would have made them the largest tour operator in the UK, was blocked by the European
Commission.3 Contrary to the position taken by the MMC, the European Commission ruled that
the relevant market for the evaluation of the merger was the short-haul foreign package holiday
market. Short-haul holidays include mostly Mediterranean destinations, while destinations such
as Thailand, Florida and the Caribbean are considered long-haul. The Commission's ruling
supports our decision to focus on one of the two market segments. We chose to concentrate on
the short-haul market for a number of reasons. First, the short-haul market is more concentrated
into the hands of the four major operators. Second, the relative homogeneity of short-haul
destinations facilitates cross-country comparisons. And third, the large number of destinations
per country gives us enough degrees of freedom to support inference at the country level. In
1998 the four major tour operators held a combined 85.5% of the UK short-haul foreign package
holiday market: Thomson had 30.7%; Thomas Cook, 20.4%, Airtours 19.4% and First Choice
15.0%.4
2Source: Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1997).
3The decision was later overturned by the European Court of First Instance.
4Source: AC Nielsen data reported in European Commission (1999).
64 Conceptual framework
We now sketch a conceptual framework that will guide and motivate our empirical analysis.
The object of our inquiry is the market for package tourism. A product in this market is
a vacation package that includes { at the very least { accommodation at and transportation
to a pre-speci¯ed hotel. In addition the package may include meals, excursions, and other
services. Products are inherently di®erentiated and consumers will choose at most one of the
numerous options available to them. Hence a discrete choice representation is a useful way
to conceptualize this market. Product attributes can be categorized as general, national (or
regional) and hotel-speci¯c. General attributes include contract terms that are not speci¯c to
the destination, such as the length of stay, transportation to and from the departing airport,
time of departure, meals included, level of service. National characteristics include weather,
cleanliness, safety, interesting sites, cultural activities, and quality of other local services such
as restaurants. Hotel attributes include the various services and amenities being o®ered and
the hotel's o±cial star rating. Because we are interested in di®erences across destinations, we
abstract from general characteristics by considering a package of ¯xed contract terms. We denote
hotel-speci¯c characteristics by H and national characteristics by N.
National rating agencies observe a subset Hn ½ H of hotel characteristics. Each country
c has its own rating system, which is a function Sn
c (Hn) that maps hotel characteristics onto
a star rating Sn 2 f2;3;4;5g. Tour operators observe a set of hotel characteristics Ho ½ H,
a set of national characteristics No ½ N, and the national rating Sn. Each operator has his
own rating system So(Ho). There is no c subscript because the operator applies uniform criteria
across all countries. Moreover, national characteristics do not enter as an argument in the rating
function because a rating system is strictly an assessment of the hotel. We impose no a priori
restrictions on the relationship between Hn and Ho. It is possible that operators observe some
characteristics that national agencies do not, and vice versa.
We think of consumers as having preferences over characteristics H and N and over the star
ratings Sn and So. Consumers value the ratings because they can not observe all elements in H,
7so the ratings may incorporate additional information. Tour operators take consumer preferences
into account in order to formulate a pricing function P(Ho;No;Sn;So). Consequently, the price
of a package depends on the characteristics of the region as well as the quality of the individual
hotel.
5 Data
For our empirical analysis we use data lifted from the 2003 catalogues of the two biggest tour
operators, Thomson and Thomas Cook. Each operator publishes a large catalogue (with an
enticing name like \Summer Sun") that lists all packages available to various destinations.
Several di®erent packages are available for each hotel. The traveler can choose the number
of days he will be staying (usually 7, 10 or 14) and the meal option he prefers (self-catering,
bed and breakfast, half-board, full-board). For each hotel-year we focus on the seven-day, half-
board package in high and low season.5 Whenever a half-board package was not available we
took the price of an alternative package, usually the full-board one. The data for each package
include the price, o±cial star rating, dates and duration of stay, and several hotel and locality
characteristics.
There are 229 hotels in the Thomson catalogue and 151 hotels in the Thomas Cook catalogue.
Eighteen hotels are included in both catalogues, leaving us with 362 unique hotels. The overlap
between the two catalogues is surprisingly little. This might indicate that agents specialize in
di®erent niches of the market, or that hotels prefer to deal with only one operator. Hotels
are located in the following Mediterranean regions: Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain
(which is divided into Mainland, the Balearic Islands and Canary Islands), Tunisia and Turkey.
Table 1 shows the distribution of hotels by o±cial star rating in each region.6 Four-star hotels
are the most popular with both agents, but Thomson has more three- and two-stars hotels in
5We chose the second week of August for our high-season package and the second week in May for the low-
season package. We carried out our analysis on high and low season prices separately and got very similar results.
Consequently, in the paper we only report results using high season prices.
6 Greece presents a problem because it does not rate its hotels according to the usual star system. Instead, it
has categories called Deluxe, A, B, and C. We translated this into stars by assigning ¯ve stars to Deluxe hotels,
four stars to category A hotels and 3 stars to category B and C hotels.
8Table 1: Distribution of hotels by country and star rating
Country 2-star 3-star 4-star 5-star Total
Balearics 5 39 26 0 70
Canaries 0 8 43 1 52
Cyprus 1 9 24 2 36
Greece 0 19 35 10 64
Italy 0 9 35 1 45
Malta 0 2 12 1 15
Spain 2 20 34 0 56
Tunisia 0 2 15 3 20
Turkey 1 5 9 7 22
Total 9 113 233 25 380
Of which:
Thomson 7 77 132 13 229
Thomas Cook 2 36 101 12 151
its portfolio.
National hotel star ratings should in principle serve as objective indicators of quality. In
practice, however, they are not very useful for cross-country comparisons because every country's
national rating agency has its own set of criteria for awarding stars. Hence four-star hotels in
one country may on average be of higher quality than four-star hotels in a di®erent country.
Fortunately, tour operators are well aware of this and many of them have devised their own
rating system. The tour operator's rating of each hotel is provided in the brochures, alongside
the o±cial rating. Thus the consumer is able to use the tour operator's rating as an objective
indicator of quality that is comparable across countries. The agent's rating is an extremely
useful benchmark that we will make extensive use of in this paper.
Operators' ratings are based on objective criteria similar to those used by national rating
agencies but also { critically { on information they collect from past customers and their own
experience with the establishment. Given their improved information content, these ratings
should re°ect quality better than those provided by national rating agencies. On the other
hand, it is possible that operators are not objective in their ratings. For example, one could
imagine scenarios where tour operators use the threat of downgrading a hotel as a bargaining tool
9Table 2: Cross-tabulation of national versus operator ratings
National Rating
2-star 3-star 4-star 5-star Total
2-star 2 9 0 0 11
Thomson's 3-star 5 46 9 0 60
Rating 4-star 0 22 93 3 118
5-star 0 0 30 10 40
Total 7 77 132 13 229
2+ -star 1 1 0 0 2
Thomas 3-star 1 22 5 0 28
Cook's 3+ -star 0 12 11 0 23
Rating 4-star 0 1 74 4 79
4+ -star 0 0 8 3 11
5-star 0 0 3 5 8
Total 2 36 101 12 151
in price negotiations. Although we can not rule this out, it is hard to imagine that operators can
give misleading ratings on a systematic basis. Such behavior may successfully mislead consumers
in the short run, but it is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run. This is especially true in the
case of some operators (such as Thomson), who publish separate customer feedback scores in
addition to their own rating. Thus readers are able to separate out the impact of the operator's
assessment of the facility on the overall rating. This transparency makes it di±cult for the
operator to manipulate the ratings.
Table 2 displays a frequency cross-tabulation of o±cial versus operator ratings separately
for each operator. The number in each cell denotes the number of hotels with the correspond-
ing ratings. The cross-diagonal (in boldface) indicates agreement between national and agent
ratings. Although the majority of ratings coincide, a substantial number of hotels are o® the
diagonal, meaning that they get a di®erent rating from the agent than they do from their na-
tional agency. Moreover, discrepancies go in both directions: some hotels are upgraded by the
agent while others are downgraded. Three-star hotels are more likely to be upgraded by both
agents. Thomson is also more likely to upgrade four-star hotels, while Thomas Cook is roughly
equally likely to upgrade or downgrade them. Note also that Thomas Cook creates intermediate
10Table 3: Rating di®erences among travel agents
Thomas Cook
Thomson Downgrade Same Upgrade Total
Downgrade 1 0 0 1
Same 1 9 3 13
Upgrade 0 2 2 4
Total 2 11 5 18
categories by giving out pluses (\+").
The fact that 18 hotels appear in both catalogues gives us the opportunity to check whether
the operators' ratings are consistent with each other. The number of hotels is too small to
support statistical inference, but we can at least look for blatant discrepancies. A summary
of the ratings is provided in Table 3. Half of the 18 hotels maintain their o±cial rating in
both catalogues. Thomas Cook provided a di®erent rating more often, probably because it
has intermediate categories. It downgraded two hotels, one of which was also downgraded by
Thomson, and upgraded ¯ve hotels, two of which were also upgraded by Thomson. Thomson
upgraded two other hotels that Thomas Cook did not upgrade. Reassuringly, there is no case of
a hotel that was upgraded by one agent but downgraded by the other. Some of the di®erences
can be attributed to the fact that Thomson takes into account customer feedback in formulating
its ratings, while Thomas Cook bases its ratings on \the views of its own managers in the UK
and overseas". Overall, there is no evidence to contradict our assumption that operators provide
objective ratings.
6 Rating the ratings
We start our empirical analysis by estimating the empirical analogues of the rating functions
Sn
c (Hn) and So(Ho). Let Sn
i and So
i be the national and operator ratings of hotel i whose
characteristics are described in vector Hi and its location is encoded in the vector of country
11dummies Di. The general form of the equations to be estimated is:
Sn











The equations were estimated using an ordered logit speci¯cation because the dependent vari-
ables are discrete. In the ¯rst two columns of Table 4 we present results of estimating equations
(1) and (2) without the country dummies Di.7 Although the rating functions are broadly simi-
lar, the e®ects of the various characteristics are stronger in the operators' rating function. This
is probably a selection e®ect that arises because the characteristics we observe are taken from
the operators' catalogues. Operators are likely to include in their catalogues characteristics that
they consider important. In other words, the set of characteristics that we observe is closer to
Ho than to Hn.
We now move to the full speci¯cation, which serves to test whether operator ratings are
comparable across countries. We know that country e®ects should be important in the national
rating function in (1) because each country has its own rating system. We therefore expect that
country dummies in ¯n
d will be statistically di®erent from zero. On the other hand, country
e®ects should not in principle a®ect tour operator ratings; we should have ¯o
d = 0. But this
will only be true if both we and the tour operators observe all relevant attributes; that is, if
Hi = Ho = H. If there are unobserved elements in H that are correlated within countries, this
will show up in our regression as country e®ects (¯o
d 6= 0).
The results from the full speci¯cation are presented in the last two columns of Table 4. As
we expected, most country dummies come out signi¯cant in the national rating regression. Some
of them are also statistically di®erent from zero in the operator regression. This means that
operators are not successful in making ratings completely comparable. On the other hand, the
coe±cients in the operating regression are smaller than the ones in the national regression and
they contribute less to the likelihood function. The mean and standard deviation of the set of
7In the reported results we assumed identical operator rating functions by pooling all hotels together. The
qualitative conclusions do not change if we estimate di®erent rating functions for each operator.
12Table 4: Estimates of the rating functions
Variable National Operator National Operator
Bathroom 0.476 1.488¤¤ 2.41¤¤ 2.635¤¤
(0.315) (0.310) (0.457) (0.403)
Heated Pool 0.588 0.808¤ 1.129¤¤ 1.065¤¤
(0.390) (0.348) (0.430) (0.362)
Waiter Service 1.225¤¤ 1.642¤¤ 0.889¤ 1.42¤¤
(0.308) (0.304) (0.360) (0.337)
Video Games -0.614y -0.361 -0.838¤ -0.499
(0.346) (0.315) (0.366) (0.327)
Mini Golf 0.378 0.621¤ 0.154 0.523y
(0.331) (0.302) (0.360) (0.313)
Aerobics 0.531y 0.154 0.870¤¤ 0.250
(0.300) (0.262) (0.329) (0.274)
Coaching 0.060 0.176 -0.670 -0.299
(0.440) (0.385) (0.480) (0.401)
Gym 1.35¤¤ 1.081¤¤ 1.558¤¤ 1.195¤¤
(0.260) (0.237) (0.297) (0.256)
Beauty Salon 0.618 1.055¤¤ 1.086¤ 1.35¤¤
(0.432) (0.397) (0.486) (0.421)
Satelite TV 1.101¤¤ 1.283¤¤ 1.133¤¤ 1.211¤¤

















N 362 362 362 362
Log-likelihood -289.738 -411.857 -247.282 -394.514
Â2
(·) 105.189 146.850 190.102 181.537
· 10 10 18 18
H0 : ¯d = 0, Â2
(8) 73.32 34.53
Signi¯cance levels: y : 10%, ¤ : 5%, ¤¤ : 1%.
13eight coe±cients in the operator regression is 0.936 and 0.802, compared to 1.315 and 1.428 in
the national rating regression. Adding country dummies increases the log-likelihood and the
Â2 statistic by considerably more in the national rating function than in the operator rating
function. In the last row of Table 4 we present test statistics for the null hypothesis that the
country dummies are all zero. The null is rejected for both regressions, but more strongly so in
the national regression. We interpret this as evidence that operators are successful in mitigating
the information problem by providing ratings that are more suitable { albeit not perfect { for
international comparisons.8
7 Ratings and prices
Our next task is to explore the relationship between ratings and prices. We must ¯rst note an
important distinction between the two catalogues. In addition to the standard services, each
operator o®ers a number of additional options such as allowance for extra luggage, transportation
to and from the departing airport, better check-in times, in-°ight service, and so on. In addition,
the price travelers have to pay depends on their °ight's departure time; day °ights are more
expensive. Our two operators take di®erent approaches to pricing those options. Thomas Cook
o®ers a menu of four preset packages (extra, standard, economy and basic) that travelers can
choose from. The price listed in the catalogue is the price of the extra package, and discounts
for lesser packages are reported in footnotes. Thomson, on the other hand, allows its customers
to choose any combination of options they like. The catalogue reports the price of the basic
package and the price of each option. One might interpret this as an indication that Thomas
Cook tries to steer its customers towards the high-quality package, while Thomson takes a less
aggressive approach.
Since quality ratings are discrete, each category covers a range of quality levels. Hence,
two holiday packages allocated the same star rating can di®er substantially in terms of price.
This phenomenon is not observed only between destinations but also within a particular region,
8The evidence we present does not constitute a formal test. There is no direct way to implement a formal test
because we have di®erent dependent variables in the two regressions.




















2 stars 3 stars 4 stars 5 stars
TUI TC TUI TC TUI TC TUI TC
Note: TUI=Thomson; TC=Thomas Cook. Hotels are classified by their official (national) rating.
where the two packages are rated by the same authority. The distribution of prices by agent and
hotel category is summarized in the box-and-whiskers plot in Figure 1. 9 The large di®erence in
prices between operators re°ects the fact that for Thomas Cook we have the price of the extra
(high quality) package, while for Thomson we have the price of the basic package. We note that
there is considerable within-agent overlap between categories. For example, the price range of
three-star Thomas Cook packages is a subset of the price range of the same agent's four-star
packages. These distributions suggest that the o±cial rating is not a very accurate descriptor
of quality.
Pricing patterns of holiday packages can be explored in more detail using hedonic analysis.
9The \box" indicates the inter-quartile range (from the 25th to the 75th percentile) and the \whiskers" indicate
the whole range. Outliers are plotted individually.
15Table 5: Comparison of o±cial and agent ratings
Thomson Thomas Cook
(1) (2) (3) (10) (20) (30)
National 2-star -0.091 -0.031 -0.157¤ -0.122¤¤ -0.126¤¤ -0.143¤¤
(0.070) (0.065) (0.066) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033)
National 4-star 0.088¤¤ 0.015 0.109¤¤ 0.033¤ 0.031 0.052¤¤
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018)
National 5-star 0.196¤¤ 0.074y 0.267¤¤ 0.071¤¤ 0.045y 0.122¤¤
(0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031)
Operator 2-star -0.278¤¤
(0.060)
Operator 4-star 0.065¤¤ 0.003
(0.023) (0.023)
Operator 5-star 0.159¤¤ 0.081¤
(0.031) (0.035)






N 229 229 229 151 151 151
R2 0.5156 0.6305 0.6096 0.5345 0.5531 0.5753
F(N¡K;N¡1) 10.39 13.29 13.10 6.41 6.18 6.41
Signi¯cance levels: y : 10%, ¤ : 5%, ¤¤ : 1%. White standard errors are reported. Set of 10 characteristics,
country dummies, half- and full-board identi¯ers and intercept also included in the regression.
We specify the empirical analogue of the operator's pricing function as:









i are vectors of dummy variables representing hotel i's national and operator rating
respectively. The set of country dummies Di captures national characteristics N. Our aim
is to use equation (3) to answer two questions. First, are national or operator ratings better
determinants of price? Second, how important are country e®ects in the determination of price?
We perform our analysis separately for each agent and present the results in two separate tables,
corresponding to the two questions we want to answer.
16In Table 5 we focus on the impact of ratings on price. We present results from di®erent
speci¯cations, suppressing coe±cients that are not directly relevant. In column 1 we estimate
equation (3) without the operator's rating (So
i ). National ratings are statistically signi¯cant and
take on reasonable values.10 In column 2 we add the operator's rating to the regression (that is,
we estimate the full equation (3)). This addition dampens the coe±cients on national ratings
substantially, rendering them statistically and economically insigni¯cant. Their explanatory
power seems to have been taken over by operator ratings, which take on reasonable values and
are statistically signi¯cant. This indicates that agent ratings are more tightly correlated with
prices than o±cial national ratings. As a further test, in column 3 we present the results from
estimating the following variant of equation (3):
lnPi = ® + °d ¢ sgn[Sn
i ¡ So







i ] takes the value of 1 if hotel i is upgraded by the operator (or underrated
by the national agency), -1 if the hotel is downgraded (overrated) and 0 if the two ratings are the
same.11 In the case of Thomson, upgraded hotels command a 7.9% premium over hotels of the
same national category that are \correctly" rated, while downgraded hotels are 17.7% cheaper.
Similar results but on a smaller scale are observed in the case of Thomas Cook: upgraded hotels
are 2.8% more expensive while downgraded hotels are 5.1% cheaper.
In Table 6 we turn our attention to price variation across regions.12 In order to identify the
e®ects of di®erent factors we start with a basic formulation and proceed by incrementally adding
groups of explanatory variables. The di®erence between column 1 (1') and column 2 (2') is the
addition of hotel characteristics. They make a relatively small contribution to the ¯t of the
regression, raising the R2 by about .04-.05. The addition of country dummies in column 3 raises
the R2 by quite a bit more, about 0.17 and 0.13 for Thomson and Thomas Cook respectively.
Thus, country dummies have a lot of explanatory power.
10Interestingly, Thomas Cook features less price variation than Thomson.
11Equation (4) is slightly less general than equation (3) in that it restricts the di®erence °n ¡°o ´ °d to be the
same for all star categories.
12Recall that, with the exception of Spain, regions are countries. Spain is divided into three regions: the
mainland, the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands; mainland Spain is the excluded region in the regressions.
17Table 6: Estimates of country e®ects in the pricing function
Thomson Thomas Cook
(1) (2) (3) (10) (20) (30)
Half-board 0.042y 0.045y 0.048 0.066¤ 0.073¤ 0.075¤
(0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.035)
Full-board 0.21¤¤ 0.187¤¤ 0.195¤¤ 0.176¤¤ 0.191¤¤ 0.171¤¤
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.028) (0.036) (0.035)
National 2-star -0.043 -0.026 -0.031 -0.082¤¤ -0.092¤ -0.126¤¤
(0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.027) (0.038) (0.035)
National 4-star 0.029 0.021 0.015 0.022 0.02 0.031
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
National 5-star 0.056 0.044 0.074y 0.044y 0.039 0.045y
(0.052) (0.050) (0.039) (0.024) (0.028) (0.026)
Operator 2-star -0.223¤¤ -0.237¤¤ -0.278¤¤
(0.063) (0.062) (0.060)
Operator 4-star 0.075¤¤ 0.083¤¤ 0.065¤¤ 0.017 0.008 0.003
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
Operator 5-star 0.2¤¤ 0.204¤¤ 0.159¤¤ 0.099¤¤ 0.082¤ 0.081¤
(0.039) (0.040) (0.031) (0.028) (0.035) (0.035)



















included? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 229 229 229 151 151 151
R2 0.4069 0.4597 0.6305 0.3837 0.4233 0.5531
F(N¡K;N¡1) 16.12 9.21 13.29 16.48 6.69 6.18
Signi¯cance levels: y : 10%, ¤ : 5%, ¤¤ : 1%. White standard errors are reported. The
speci¯cation also includes an intercept.
18Coe±cients on country dummies represent percentage price di®erences between hotels of
similar quality in di®erent countries. The estimates show substantial price variation across
countries, but also across agents. In Thomson's catalogue, Italian hotels are substantially more
expensive than those of any other country. In Thomas Cook, on the other hand, Italian hotels do
not command such a premium. Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and the Spanish island groups enjoy a
premium over the Spanish mainland from both agents.13 Mainland Spain is in fact the cheapest
region in the Thomas Cook catalogue, while Malta and Tunisia are cheaper in the Thomson
catalogue.
8 Whither country di®erences?
Econometric estimates of the type we presented in the previous section are of great interest
to national tourism authorities who are concerned about the competitiveness of their national
tourist product. Should then countries with positive price premia worry that they are overpriced?
A conclusive answer to that question is not possible without information on tourism de-
mand. It seems unlikely, however, that unwarranted country premia would be sustainable in
a competitive market like this one. A more likely explanation is that country premia repre-
sent national characteristics (tourism production inputs) that make the vacationer's stay more
pleasurable and thus increase the quality of the service being o®ered. These characteristics
could include weather, distance, auxiliary attractions, infrastructure, cleanliness, hospitality,
and security. Some destinations may also have linguistic, cultural, or historical ties to di®erent
origin countries.14 It is also possible that some countries may have higher prices because of high
domestic demand for tourism; Italy may be an example of that.
A natural question that arises is whether cross-country price di®erences are the result of a
conscious policy on the part of the individual countries or just the outcome of a complex process
that depends on history, culture, factor endowments and other in°uences re°ecting quality
13We remind the reader that the case of Greece should be interpreted with some caution because of its unique
rating system; see footnote 6.
14For example, Cyprus and Malta are former British colonies.




































Regions: BAlearics, CAnaries, CYprus, GReece, ITaly, MAlta, SPain, TUnisia, TuRkey
perceptions. The rating system is one place where we can look for evidence of national policy
e®ects. Countries may use the rating system to manipulate standards in their hotel industry
and thus the quality of the national tourist product. We can exploit the fact that we observe
both national and independent (agent) hotel ratings to look for systematic patterns in rating
policies. In Figure 2 we report the frequency of upgrading and downgrading of hotels by each
agent in each country. The dark middle bar for each country represents the proportion of hotels
that received the same rating by both the national agency and the tour operator. The bar to the
left represents hotels that were upgraded by the operator, while the bar to the right represents
those hotels that were downgraded. A visual examination of this picture suggests that Thomson
mostly upgrades hotels in Spain (all regions), Cyprus and { to a smaller extent { Tunisia, while
it downgrades to a small degree Maltese and Turkish holiday establishments. Thomson Cook
also upgrades hotels in the Balearics and Cyprus, but it seems more likely to downgrade hotels,
mostly in Malta and Tunisia but also in Greece, Italy and Turkey.



















Log L -331.214 -189.427
LR(Â2
(8)) 47.58 40.10
As a more formal test, we estimated an ordered logit regression where the dependent variable
takes the value of 1 if the hotel is overrated by the national agency (downgraded by the tour
operator) , 0 if the two ratings coincide, and -1 if it is underrated (upgraded). The explanatory
variables are country dummies.15 Results are reported in Table 7. A negative coe±cient means
that the tour operator generally upgrades hotels from the country or, equivalently, that the
country underrates its hotels relative to the tour operator. The estimates here are very similar
for both agents. Hotels in Cyprus and the Balearics are systematically underrated relative to
those in mainland Spain, while those in Turkey are overrated. Greek, Italian, Tunisian and
Maltese hotels are also overrated, but the signi¯cance of those estimates is marginal.
We can do little more than speculate on whether the consistent under- or over-rating by
15We use only 3- and 4-star hotels because of the truncation problem: 5-star hotels can not be upgraded and
2-star hotels can not be downgraded. Note also that for the purpose of this estimation we collected ratings from
more hotels than our main sample in order to get more precise estimates.
21some countries of their tourist accommodations is deliberate. It is certainly possible that high
standards for tourist establishments is part of a national policy that aims to set the country's
national tourist product at a high level. For example, tourism authorities in small and/or
highly developed tourist destinations may wish to encourage high quality tourism in order to
minimize the external costs of congestion. By being strict in awarding stars to their hotels, the
tourist authorities force producers to raise the quality of their tourist packages, thereby keeping
congestion down. At the same time, this policy discourages low quality tourism which may
have a higher externality cost than high quality tourism.16 By contrast, countries targeting
low-budget tourists may not be as strict in handing out stars. Circumstantial evidence from
our conversations with industry people lend support to this argument. But we leave a more
detailed analysis of the factors that determine tourism quality levels in di®erent countries to
future work.17
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper we address two questions. First, how valuable are independent tour operators in
providing information about competing tourist destinations? Second, how does the quality of
tourist accommodations vary across countries? Our analysis suggests that tour operators play
a valuable part in disseminating information in the market for tourism. They provide ratings
that are better quality indicators than o±cial ratings and thus improve on government-provided
information. Tour operator ratings go a long way towards explaining price variation in holiday
packages. Nonetheless, substantial variation across countries remains even after controlling for
quality. We conjecture that this may be part of a conscious national policy to control the quality
of the national tourist product.
16Negative externalities related to tourism include congestion, environmental degradation and natural resource
exhaustion. Some people also attribute the spread of social problems like drug and alcohol abuse to foreign
in°uences. On the positive externality side, tourism encourages cultural exchange and the preservation of cultural
and historical heritage. Overall, it is probably fair to say that low-quality tourists impart a higher negative
externality cost and a lower positive externality bene¯t than high-quality tourists.
17Note that countries would choose to enforce stricter standards only if they believed that the market would
recognize higher quality and reward them with an appropriate price.
22Tourism is a rare example of an industry where intermediaries provide ratings for products
they themselves sell. One might wonder why we do not see independent hotel rating agencies,
like we see them for banks, bonds, or even baseball cards. The answer likely has to do with
the cost of rating a hotel: providing an accurate assessment of a hotel's quality requires visiting
the hotel and spending some time there. It is reasonable to incur such a cost when rating
a large bank, but it may not be in the case of a much smaller operation, such as a hotel.
Tour operators, through their repeated interaction with hotels, are well placed to providing an
accurate assessment of the establishment's quality.
Our analysis suggests that UK tour operators are more e®ective than governments in miti-
gating the information problem in the market for package tourism. Does this mean that there is
no room for improved government intervention in information provision? Not necessarily. Tour
operators' ratings are not complete, as they only rate hotels they do business with. Moreover,
they are generally only accessible to their UK customers, although the internet is changing that.
Smaller markets may not be able to support intermediaries because the rents to be extracted are
small. Improved information provision may serve well governments aiming to attract tourism
from new countries that do not have well-developed tour operator industries.
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